We consider an exchange market for an indivisible, heterogeneous good where pairs of buyers and sellers bargain over prices in different transactions.
Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to study the process of negotiation and price formation in two-sided markets where the traded objects are heterogeneous and indivisible. Quoting from Shapely and Shubik (1971) : 'Twosided market models are important as Cournot, Edgeworth, Bohm-Bawerk, and others have observed, not only for the insights they may give into more general economic situations with many types of traders, but also for the simple reason that in real life many markets and most actual transactions are in fact bilateral -i.e., bring together a buyer and a seller of a single commodity'.
We consider here a market for a good which is available in indivisible units. The units of this good may differ in quality. There are two a-priori determined distinct groups: buyers and sellers. All agents may possess a perfectly divisible good called 'money', and each seller has also one unit of the indivisible good. Each agent has preferences on the possible combinations of money (which represents here the consumption of all 'other' goods) and units of the indivisible good. We assume that no agent wishes to own more than one unit of the indivisible good. Shapley and Shubik (1971) studied such a market modeled as a game with transferable utility. Kaneko (1982) generalized their results to games without the transferable utility assumption. The main results are that the core of such a market is not empty, and that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the set of allocations in the core. For an excellent survey of two-sided markets see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) .
We will use here Kaneko's model and our study begins with the following observation: Assume that a buyer and a seller contemplate a transaction, while regarding as fixed the prices paid for the units of the indivisible good in other transactions. The seller has then a minimum price for which he is willing to sell in the existing conditions. At lower prices he would find other buyers willing to pay more for his unit. Similarly, the buyer has a maximal price which she is prepared to pay for that unit given the existing conditions. If the price is higher, the buyer would prefer to buy other units, and she can afford it. The transaction can be mutually profitable if and only if the agreed price falls between these extremes, and, moreover, one can show that a certain system of transactions leads to a competitive allocation if and only if, for each pair in the system, the agreed price has the above described property. Note that the 'reservation prices' are not primitives of the model, but are endogenously arising at each specification of prices.
For a given pair, the environment (i.e. the prices in all other transactions) cannot uniquely determine the price in their deal. There is a whole range of agreements which could lead to a competitive allocation when combined with fixed outside prices. We are faced with the natural question of how, in each transaction, exactly one price is chosen by the matched agents? Any short examination of markets where few agents trade relatively valuable goods would reveal that the process of price formation involves some element of bargaining. The results of other negotiations can determine, and this is very important, the outside options available to the various agents.
We assume here a rather myopic and optimistic way of calculating outside options: the agents do not foresee the whole evolution of the market after possible breakdowns in present negotiations. They make only a rough assessment of their bargaining power at one point in time. We only require that the negotiated outcome depends on the outside options, and this dependence follows our intuition -an improvement in the terms of trade for one agent (due to price changes in other transactions) should not disadvantage this agent in his present negotiation.
By inter-relating the prices in different transactions through the influence of outside options the following problem arises: Negotiations in transaction A determines the terms of trade in transaction B. Further, the resulting price in transaction B may change the terms of trade in A and at least one of the sides may have incentives to renegotiate. Renegotiation in A matters for B and so on . . . The equilibrium concept must take care of this situation in a consistent manner.
The previous consideration suggests a sequential dynamic process of price formation between matched partners, and indeed we will present such a process which converges to equilibrium for some initial conditions. At equilibrium, the agents have no incentive to renegotiate (given the existing bargaining procedures).
This approach to exchange, negotiation, and the combination of the two suggests that the model is more suitable for situations where there is no oneshot exchange, but longer run relationships. Price contracts hold for a period of time and they may be renegotiated if the environment changed. Good examples would be the house-rental market, or the labor market for a given profession. Consider, for example, the following quotation from The Economist, August 11, 1990 : '(Rock) Stars usually stick to their record labels but use outside offers to renegotiate better deals'.
For a correct application of our specific model to a labor market one needs to assume that employees care only about their pay and not about the identity of their employers, but more general models where the results hold can be easily analyzed.
The 'stability under renegotiation' idea used here goes back to Harsanyi. We quote from Harsanyi (1977, p. 196 ): A particular payoff vector 'will represent the equilibrium outcome of a bargaining among the n-players only if no pair of players has any incentive to redistribute their payoffs between them, as long as the other players' payoffs are kept constant'. This idea has been exactly formulated in a game theoretical framework by Davis and Maschler (1965) in their work on the kernel of a cooperative game. The work of Davis and Maschler has been elegantly used by Rochford (1984) in the framework of the assignment games with transferable utility due to Shapley and Shubik (1971) . Abstact generalizations of Rochford's work can be found in Roth and Sotomayor (1988), and Moldovanu (1990) .
Modeling the market situation as a game with transferable utility implies that the utility functions of the agents are separable, additive and linear in a commodity called 'money'. While this may be a reasonable modeling assumption in some cases, it has considerable drawbacks in a model where the value of the traded objects are high relative to income. The above mentioned utility functions do not allow for any income effect! We obtain several different pairings of buyers and sellers which are compatible with Walrasian prices, while with transferable utility there is generically one such pairing. Moreover, the set of utility vectors corresponding to competitive allocations for a given pairing may well be non-connected, as opposed to a convex set for transferable utility. This creates an additional difficulty when using topological fixed point arguments. For details see Moldovanu (1990) .
Finally, we wish to mention the recent approach to bargaining in markets which uses explicit strategic models embedded in various market models. An excellent book on the subject is Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) . While different in emphasis and treatment, the basic idea of a market as a network of interconnected bargainers is common to this literature and to our work. This holds also for the important role of outside options (although the calculation of these options differs), and for the comparison with the benchmark -the Walrasian equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the exchange model and the competitive equilibria. In section 3 we describe the bargaining model, define the outside options of the agents, and relate the structure of the set of competitive equilibria with the bargaining range in bilateral transactions. The main results are gathered in section 4: We prove the existence of bargaining equilibria and compare this set with the set of competitive equilibria in usual and replicated markets. We also describe a dynamic process of bargaining which may converge to an equilibrium. In section 5 we discuss the results and some possible extensions. The proofs are gathered in section 6.
The exchange model
We consider a market for an indivisible good. The units of this good can be different in quality. We will call these items 'houses'.
There are two distinct groups of agents (or players), B= {b,,. . . ,b,} and s={s, )...) s,}.
The members of B will be called 'buyers', and the members of S will be called 'sellers'.
Each player i in N = BUS owns an amount of money Wi. Money is perfectly divisible and should be interpreted as a composite good.
Each seller owns, in addition to money, one unit of the indivisible good. The house of seller si will be denoted by hi.
Thus, the initial endowment of seller si is esi =(wsi,hi) and the initial endowment of buyer bj is ebj = (wqj, d) We make the following assumptions on the utility functions Ui:
Vie N, Ui is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to money. Condition (2.2) is clear. Condition (2.3) says that houses are desirable. Condition (2.4), which is slightly more unusual, has the following intuitive explanation [see also Kaneko (1982) ]: Our model is a partial equilibrium model, where money plays the iole of all commodities that are not explicitly considered. Therefore it is normal to have money but no house (in which case one may rent a hotel room), but it is not normal to own a house and not consume any other thing! Condition (2.5) is needed to ensure that sellers do not want to buy another house after selling the one they initially own.
We normalize the utility functions of the agents such that the utility of each agent from his initial endowment is exactly zero. The results will be independent of this normalization.
The above described economy will be denoted by E = {(q, Vi) i E N}. Due to the special properties of our markets (two types, indivisibility, satiation) one can consider w.1.o.g. only those allocations which are derived from exchanges which take place in coalitions of size no larger than two (one buyer and one seller). Indeed, only these coalitions will play a role when considering the core of the economy, and hence also for the competitive allocations. We now define special partitions of N which have as elements only mixed pairs (one buyer, one seller), and singletons:
A partition LZ = {T,, . . . , T,} of N will be called an E-partition if it satisfies:
then TjnB#QI and TjnS#@.
(2.7)
An allocation xi is feasible for i if it is just the initial endowment of this individual.
Consider a pair T= {bi,Sj} with initial endowment (wbi,d) and (wsj, hj) respectively. An allocation xr is feasible for this pair if it has the form {(mbi, hj), (m,,, d)), or the form {(mbi, d), (msj, hj)}, where mbi + msj 5 wbi + wsj.
(2.8)
An allocation x is feasible for the economy E if there exists an E-partition ZZ such that for each TE ZI, xT is feasible for 7:
An allocation x is individually-rational (IR) if the following holds:
A pair T= {bi,sj} can improve upon an allocation x if there exists an allocation yr feasible for T with U,(y') > Ui(X'), tli~ 'T:
The core of the economy, C(E), is the set of all individually-rational allocations which cannot be improved upon. This definition of the core coincides for the considered economies with the usual definition of the core where all coalitions are allowed to block. Note that in the core of our exchange economy there are no side-payments in the sense that, if a buyer gives up a certain amount of money in order to receive a house, this amount goes in full to the owner of this house and not, say, to 'bribe' another potential buyer. Also, it is easy to show that if x E C(E), then the allocation of a singleton (i.e. a trader not paired in the respective E-partition) is exactly her initial endowment, and her utility is hence zero.
A vector of prices is a vector PE KY,!' where pi represents the price of house hi, for 1 s i 5 I, and p r+ r = 0, this last price being the price of a dummy house.
An E-partition I7 and a vector of prices p determine in a unique way an allocation x = x(l7, p) as follows:
(1) For i=TeIZ, xi=,. Such an allocation will be called price-generated.
(2.12) Definition 2.1. A pair (n,p) is a competitive equilibrium if the pricegenerated allocation 1= x(n, p) has the following properties:
(2.14)
(2) Vsk ES if 2" = (@I,,, hi) then (1) The core of E is not empty.
(2) Every core allocation is price-generated by a pair (ZZ,p) which is a competitive equilibrium. (3) Every competitive equilibrium (l7,p) price-generates an allocation in the core of the economy E.
Note that point (3) above holds in general for exchange models, but point (2) is rather special.
The bargaining model
Consider a buyer and a seller which are about to make a transaction, and consider the situation where the prices of all the other (i.e. not involved in this transaction) houses are already determined. Assume that the buyer and the seller agree on a certain price. If the resulting vector of prices is not competitive there will be at least one buyer and one seller which will have the opportunity to achieve a better deal for both of them by leaving their actual partners and trade together. (This follows from the equivalence between core allocations and competitive allocations -Theorem 2.2). In this case the situation is fundamentally unstable, but even if we accept that final outcomes should be Walrasian, the question is whether the price of the considered house is uniquely determined. Note that we do not inquire the question of uniqueness of competitive equilibria, but we ask whether in a competitive equilibrium the result of all outside transactions already determines the result of the considered one. The answer to this question is negative: Usually there is a whole range of prices which could be agreed upon by our pair such that the resulting vector or prices is competitive.
We must now ask how is then a price chosen by a given pair, between the several consistent with the stability of the market. The answer offered here is one that involves bargaining between the agents. The prices in the outside transactions play an important role because they actually determine, at a given moment, the outside options available to the traders. Bargaining in one pair affects the options of other pairs, and some agents may wish to renegotiate. If this renegotiation takes place, again options changed for others, and so ad infinitum. We are confronted with a problem of stability and consistency when we observe not the isolated pair, but the entire system of bilateral interactions.
We first approach the question of indeterminacy, and define the outside options: Let ZI be an E-partition, p a vector or prices and let T = {bi, sj} EII. Let x = x(ZZ, p) be the price-generated allocation.
The outside option price qbi of buyer bi is defined as the price such that
Ubi(wb, -qbi, hj) =max ubi(wbi -f?f, hf).
The outside option price for the buyer in T is the maximal price bi is prepared to pay for the house of sj such that, by buying this house and paying this price, her utility will be no less than the utility achieved by buying any other house at current prices. Observe that the outside option price of the buyer is non-negative, because h, can be a dummy house (this means that the buyer can decide not to buy at all), the price of dummy houses is always zero, and because we assumed desirability of houses [see For a buyer bk define pr as the price such that (3.2) pf is the price which buyer bk is prepared to pay for the house of sj such that her utility will be no less than his current one.
For a seller sj define py as the price such that uSj(wSj +pj', d I= We,,).
pp is the minimum price which Sj might accept for his house. At lower prices this seller prefers not to sell at all, and remain with his initial endowment. This price is non-negative by desirability of houses.
The outside option price @j is defined then as
The outside option price for the seller in T is the maximal price this seller could achieve by selling his house to other buyers, while keeping these buyers at their current levels of utility, provided that this is at least as large as the minimal acceptable price for this seller.
For agents which are not matched in ZI we define the outside options prices in a similar way: because these agents are not paired we can remove the restriction f #j in (3.1), and the restriction k#i in (3.4).
The outside option prices depend, of course, on the pair (Z7,p) but we will suppress this for the sake of simplicity of notation.
Given a vector of prices p=(pl, pz, . . . &+,) we write (~-~,pj) for the vector that is identical to p in all but the jth coordinate, which is changed to pj. We have the following: Theorem 3.1 describes exactly, for one pair, the bargaining range which is compatible with stability of the market. The outside option prices are then the extremities of this range. Note that Theorem 3.1 shows that the Walrasian paradigm in such a model (i.e. -with few agents) does not imply that agents are 'price-takers'. Prices can be negotiated in a whole range without affecting the stability of the market. Theorem 3.1 is a special case of a more general theorem about sections of the core found in Moldovanu (1989) .
We now describe the bargaining model: Given the utility functions of the members in a pair, which are fixed throughout this exposition, bargaining should depend only on their outside option prices. Thus a bargaining function is a function F: [w: -FIR + where the argument is a pair of prices representing the outside options (first coordinate for seller, second for buyer) and the result is the negotiated price. We impose the following conditions on F is continuous and monotonic non-decreasing in each coordinate. (3.8)
Condition (3.7) is a condition of individual rationality. Continuity is clear, and monotonicity represents our intuition about outside options: If p1 (for the seller!) increases, then his situation improved and he should not be worse off than before. Similarly, if pz (for the buyer!) increases, then her situation changed for the worse (she is required to pay more outside) and therefore she should not be made better off -the result of the actual bargaining is also a price which is not lower than before.
AlI the main solutions to the bargaining problem (Nash, KalaiSmorodinski, etc.) satisfy conditions (3.7) and (3.8). Moreover, non-cooperative bargaining models with outside options [see Shaked and Sutton (1984) ] also yield bargaining functions with these properties. We do not require that all pairs use the same bargaining procedure. The procedure used by a pair 17; given the respective utility functions, will be denoted by F,.
We are led to a definition of bargaining equilibrium where no agent has the incentive to renegotiate. where 4 is the vector of outside option prices based on (n,p).
Condition (3.9) is a stability condition: if some of the inequalities do not hold, then the respective sellers wish to change their status (i.e. not to sell at all, or to sell to another buyer). This condition, written in the language of outside options, is similar to the one in the definition of the core, but note that there are no explicit stability conditions for the buyers. The main novelty is condition (3.10): if agents bargain using the current outside options, the result is exactly the market price, so there is no incentive to renegotiate. Note that, by (3.7), this requirement is consistent with (3.9).
The next lemma says that in a bargaining equilibrium no buyer pays more than his outside option price [i.e. a stability condition similar to (3.9) is already implied also for buyers]. The reasoning behind this result is that, if a buyer pays more than her outside option, then condition (3.9) is violated for the seller with which that outside option is feasible. 
The main results
Theorem 4.1. Every economy E has a bargaining equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2. Each bargaining equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium of E.
The set of bargaining equilibria is, generically, a strict subset of the set 01 competitive equilibria.
We obtain a converse to the previous theorem by regarding replicated markets. Let d be the m-fold replica of the economy E, where each of the original agents appears m times, and mz2. The presence of identical agents -through the property of equal treatment -has the effect that in any negotiation the two outside option prices are equal, so there is really no scope for bargaining. This is exactly our intuition about truly competitive markets, where the price 'is taken as given' i.e. determined by the prices outside. It is quite interesting that one replication is enough for the previous result.
Next we describe a dynamic bargaining process which converges to a bargaining equilibrium for some special initial conditions. This process, which defines an operator on the set of feasible allocations, will also be used to prove the existence of bargaining equilibria without reference to the dynamics. The main tool will be then an algebraic fixed point theorem due to Tarski.
Let II be an E-partition and let p be a vector or prices for which the allocation x = x(ZZ, p) is individually-rational.
Let T,, . , . , Tk be the matched pairs in ZZ, where the sellers are labeled such that Vi with 15 i 5 k, si E T (the houses h 1 . . . h, are those involved in actual transactions). Let now p1 be the vector of prices resulting after the agents of TI bargained using F,, (and calculated their outside options prices based on p =p", Let p2 be the price vector resulting after the agents in T, bargained using F,, (and calculated their outside options prices based on p'). We proceed in a similar way for P3 , . . .pk, and we define an operator B,(p) =pk. The allocation of singletons remains constant (as in x) throughout this process. Denote by B:, me N, the usual powers of the operator B, (i.e. the procedure used to describe B, is repeated m times). The operator B, is not necessarily well-defined for every initial price vector p, but as we shall see in the proofs, it is well defined for all p such that (Il,p) is a competitive equilibrium. For two price vectors, p and p', we write p2p' (pgp'), if Vj~lR'+l, pjzp(i (pjsp;).
We have the following: There are many initial price vectors with the property required for convergence in the previous theorem. These prices display an interesting polarization of interests for the members of one side of the market. Two simple and well-known examples are, for a given partition for which competitive prices exist, the vector of competitive prices with the property that all buyers obtain higher utility than the one they obtain in any other competitive allocation feasible for that partition, and the analog vector for the sellers. Such vectors always exist in our model, and this fact together with the previous theorem can supply an independent proof of existence of bargaining equilibria (see Theorem 4.1). Other price vectors with the property required for the convergence are also maximal (minimal) in the sense described above, but with respect to smaller sets -connected components of the set of competitive prices for a given partition.
Discussion
The bargaining model we use is general, the only limitation being the special way in which the outside options are calculated. This mode of calculation should not be interpreted literally: it is meant to be just one possible alternative of how agents take into account the existing market conditions. This method requires (apart from complete information) less sophistication than other models where the agents are required to compute the whole future evolution of a market after a possible breakdown in present negotiations. Note that traders use here optimistic assessments, because several agents may have the same outside option in mind. In a sense our traders exhibit a kind of bounded rationality when they assess their bargaining power.
The dynamic procedure exhibited to show convergence to equilibria may give some insights to a type of situations where contracts remain valid for a period of time. At the end of the period renegotiation takes place, based on the new environment and so on (recall the quotation about rock-stars!).
Most strategic models, where the interaction between agents is more finely modeled, are based on simple exchange markets (for example, all sellers have the same type of object and reservation price, all buyers have the same reservation price). It is not entirely clear how these models perform in the presence of finely modeled markets [for possible 'failures' see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, p. 130, p. 60) . For a full market model combined with strategic bargaining see Gale (1986a, b) ].
Agents may be uncertain about the possible profits when they write contracts depending on future events, and they might be also uncertain about the conditions outside. This is translated to uncertainty about the set of feasible agreements and about the outside options, respectively. The use of a particular bargaining method may create a divergence of interests: one agent may prefer to sign a contract now, the other may prefer to wait till uncertainty is resolved. Bargaining methods exist which ensure that all agents agree to contract before the uncertainty is resolved, thus ensuring Paretooptimality. For a discussion of this, see Chun and Thomson (1990) . The methods described there satisfy the conditions imposed in our model.
If the utility functions are separable, additive and linear in 'money' we can show that bargaining equilibria of the type analyzed here are defined, and exist, also for markets where one agent may be both seller and buyer of the indivisible good [see Shapley and Scarf (1974), Quinzii ( 1984) ]. Unfortunately, results in Moldovanu (1990) imply that this may not hold for general utility functions. The two-sided markets are exceptional in this aspect. For another exceptional role played by games of pairs, in the context of the bargaining set, see Peleg (1963) .
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let (R,p) be a competitive equilibrium, and let T= {bi,sj} ER. We must have pis4 **. Otherwise, by the definition of outside options prices [see (3.1)] buyer bi can afford to buy another house at current prices (or remain single) while increasing his utility. This is a contradiction to (n,@) being a competitive equilibrium. Similarly we must have pj 2 q", otherwise seller Sj can find another buyer willing to pay 4" (or remain single) and this would increase his utility, again a contradiction. The last two inequalities prove the 'only if parts of (a) and (b).
For the 'if part of (a) let (n,p) be such that conditions (3.5) and (3.6) are satisfied. Using Kaneko's theorem (Theorem 2.2) it is enough to show that the allocation x = x(R, j?) is in the core of the economy. Because x is price generated and by condition (3.5) we obtain that x is individually-rational. Assume, on the contrary, that x is not in the core. Then, by the definition of the core, we must have a pair R which can improve upon x. Because x is price generated and individually rational it cannot be the case that R en. Therefore assume w. 1.o.g. that R = [sj, b,J with bk # bi, where bi is the partner of sj in R (if sj is single in n the proof is completely analogous). Then there exists a price p(i such that pi >pj and Ubk (Wbr-P>, h,)> Ubk(xbk) . This implies that pi <pi" [see (3.2)] and, by the definition of the outside option price for sellers (3.4), we obtain pj < q'j, which is a contradiction to condition (3.6).
For the 'if part of (b) let (n, j) be a competitive equilibrium and let T = { bi, Sj> in. Varying the price in that transaction may change the outside options of other agents. We have to prove that (it,(p_j,pj)) remains an equilibrium if pj E [qsj,qbi] . Again, it is enough to prove that the price generated allocation y = y (R, (p-j, pi) ) is in the core. Assume, on the contrary, that a pair R can improve upon y. Obviously Rf T, and if R c N\T we obtain a contradiction to the competitiveness of (n,$. Therefore assume w. 1.o.g. that R = (sj, b,J where b, # bi. The proof now continues exactly as at point (a).
Q.E.D. 
Ubi(Xbi).
Then of =pr +E [see (3.2)], and this is a contradiction because, by the definition of bargaining equilibria, (3.9), and by the delinition of outside options, (3.4), we know that p1 2 cf"' 2 pf.
Q.E.D.
For the proof of Theorem 4.1 we will use the following elegant fixed point theorem due to Tarski: Let n be an E-partition, and define P, = {p 1 (ZZ, p) is a competitive equilibrium}.
(6.1)
We define an order relation on the set 
The next three lemmata will enable the use Tarski's Theorem in our framework. The first one displays a property that is well known in two-sided models [see Demange and Gale (1985) , Roth and Sotomayor (1990) (L!,p A p') is indeed a competitive equili-brium. Obviously the resulting allocation x is feasible and individuallyrational. It is enough to show that XE C(E). Assume, on the contrary that this is not the case. Then, there is a pair T = {hi, sj} which can improve upon x. Assume w.1.o.g. that (p A P')~ =pj. This yields a contradiction to (n,p) being a competitive equilibrium. Similarly, if (p v P')~ = pi. In the same way we get the result for (p A p').
Lemma 6.3. Let Ii' be an E-partition such that P, # 125. Then, for each p E P,, the operator B, is well defined (see section 4), and B,(p) E P,.
Proof: Let TI . . . . Tk be the ordered pairs in n, and let p1 the vector or prices resulting after the members of T1 have bargained. Then pi = FT,(qSL,qb') where the outside options are calculated on the basis of p. By Theorem 3.1 and by the definition of bargaining functions we know that
The other coordinates of p1 are identical to those in p and therefore we can conclude, by Theorem 3.1, that (Z7,p') is a competitive equilibrium and p1 E P,. In a similar way we continue for pz,p3,. . till we obtain pk = B,(p) E P,.
Q.E.D. Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let (n,p) be a bargaining equilibrium. By the definition of bargaining equilibria, (3.9), by Lemma 3.3 and by definition of the bargaining functions, (3.7), we know that for each pair T = {bi, sj} EL' we have pi E [qf, gbi] . By Theorem 3.1 (n,p) is also a competitive equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let (n,p) be a competitive equilibrium of a replica economy 8'. It is easy to see that the resulting allocation has the equal treatment property. Let T= {bi,sj} be any pair in ii. Because of equal treatment the price of all houses of type hj must be pj. Therefore $j zpj. Because in a competitive equilibrium we must have qJ s pj (see Theorem 3.1), we obtain 4 -sj =pj. In a similar way we obtain qbi =pj. The bargaining range of the pair T is reduced to a single point and FT(@j,jbi)=jj_ Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let B,: P,-+P, and let p have the stated property. Then, by Lemma 6.4, the sequence Bt+@), i E N, is a monotonic sequence. P, is a compact set, and therefore this sequence converges to a limit p*. The operator B, is continuous because it is a composition of continuous bargaining functions [see ( 
i-00
Thus p* is a fixed point of B,, and (ZI,p*) is a bargaining equilibrium.
It remains to exhibit price vectors with the monotonicity property used in the previous theorem. As we have seen, for a non-empty P, the range of the operator B, is again P,. Apart from the fact that there may be generically several IZ with P, # 0, (this does not happen with linear utility functions!), the structure of the set P, is quite complicated -these sets may be not connected. Each connected component of a set P, is by itself a complete lattice (with the same operations as before). The operator B, preserves connected sets in B,. This can be seen with the help of Theorem 3.1, where any point in an entire connected interval can be substituted while preserving the stability implied by the competitive equilibrium. We can conclude that in every connected component there are minimal and maximal elements (relative to the order defined on P,) and, their image under B, being in the same component, they must exhibit the property required by Theorem 4.4, with g= 1. 
